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Revisiting Burke’s Critique of Enthusiasm 
 
Abstract: Edmund Burke is often considered an arch-critic of enthusiasm in its various 
religious and secular forms.  This article complicates this understanding by situating 
Burke’s writings against the backdrop of eighteenth century treatments of enthusiasm as a 
disturbance of the imagination. The early Burke, I show, was actually sympathetic to 
attempts by the Third Earl of Shaftesbury and others to rehabilitate enthusiasm for 
politics and rescue it from popular derision.  Next, I reveal how Burke firmly resisted 
attempts to frame anti-Protestant violence in Ireland in terms of religious delusion or 
enthusiasm, and was alert to the political dangers posed by policies legitimated by that 
framing.  Finally, I call into the question the close association often posited between the 
enthusiasm Burke saw in the French Revolution and earlier religious enthusiasms of the 







In reality, you know that I am no enthusiast, but [according] to the 
powers that God has given me, a sober and reflecting man. 
 
                             Edmund Burke, Letter to French Laurence, 10 February 1797 1 
 
These lines, written towards the end of his life, suggest that Edmund Burke 
believed his freedom from enthusiasm to be self-evident, at least to his close 
acquaintances. His political opponents, however, had frequently proven more difficult to 
convince of his reflective sobriety. Mary Wollstonecraft accused him of succumbing too 
easily to the ‘fumes’ of emotion and of grounding his opposition to the doctrine of the 
rights of man less on reflection than on ‘romantic enthusiasm.’2  Even his own Whig 
Parliamentary allies grew alarmed by the emotional pitch he frequently reached in the 
course of a Parliamentary speech and eventually threatened to have him committed as 
insane if he failed to exercise more control over his passions.3  When faced with an 
exodus of these same allies from the House of Commons during one of his more 
blistering denunciations of the French revolutionaries Burke could only lure them back 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Edmund Burke, The Correspondence of Edmund Burke (general Editor Thomas Copeland), IX, ed. R.B. 
McDowell and John A. Woods (Chicago, 1970) p 238.  Apart from Burke’s correspondence, his co-
authored Account of the European Settlements in the Americas and the Notebook, citations of his texts are 
from The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke, Paul Langford (general editor) (Oxford, 1981). The 
author would like to thank Iain Hampsher Monk, two anonymous HPT reviewers, Mary Dietz, James Farr, 
Jennifer Pitts, and Ilya Winham for valuable commentary on an earlier draft of this article.   
2 Mary Wollstonecraft, Sylvana Tomaselli ed. A Vindication of the Rights of Men and A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 45-46. 
3 Isaac Kramnick, The Rage of Edmund Burke: Portrait of an Ambivalent Conservative (New York, 1977), 
p 181.  In response to a complaint from Boswell that Burke was too frequently represented as insane, 
Samuel Johnson quipped: ‘if a man will appear extravagant as he does, and cry, can he wonder that he is 
represented as mad.’ Cited in Douglas Archibald, ‘Edmund Burke and the Conservative Imagination’ 
Eighteenth-Century Ireland / Iris an dá chultúr, 10 (1995), p 133. 
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by desperately pleading his sanity: ‘I am not mad… but speak the words of truth of 
soberness!’4  
 While most of Burke’s commentators allow for, and in some cases even admire, 
his apoplectic political passion they also agree that Burke was a steadfast defender of 
moderation and a skeptic of enthusiastic excess.5 Michael Freeman’s description of Burke 
as a ‘philosopher of moderation’ seems well deserved.6  Few other thinkers have elevated 
‘the lesson of moderation’ to the status of divine instruction or argued so forcefully the 
necessity of placing our necks under moderation’s ‘yoke.’7  Similarly, Burke’s 
castigation of the ‘warm and inexperienced enthusiasts’ at the helm of the revolutionary 
government in France and their radical English supporters has led Burke scholars to paint 
a portrait of him as an arch-critic of enthusiasm in its religious and secular forms.8 
According to this portrait, Burke recognized in the atheist French philosophes a species 
of willful subjectivism reminiscent of religious enthusiasts of seventeenth century 
England whose imagined inspiration and refusal to conform to social constraints 
occasioned widespread political unrest.  Most famously, J.G.A Pocock credited Burke 
with expanding the definition of enthusiasm from the narrow sense of a mistaken belief in 
divine inspiration to a general psychological pathology encompassing all varieties of vain 
intellectual presumption.9  Stephen K. White similarly reads Burke as attending to the 
‘familiar disease of religious fanaticism or enthusiasm,’ a socio-medical pathology that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Cited in Archibald, ‘Edmund Burke and the Conservative Imagination’, p. 133. 
5 Archibald notes that Burke’s ‘emotional equilibrium’ was often precarious, even though he was the ‘post-
Reformation world’s greatest apologist for order, stability and hierarchy’. Ibid., p. 132. 
6 Michael Freeman, Edmund Burke and the Critique of Political Radicalism (Oxford, 1980), p. 169.  
7 Burke, ‘Tracts Relative to the Popery Laws’, Writings and Speeches, IX, p. 359 and ‘Reflections on the 
Revolution in France’ Writings and Speeches, VIII, p. 152.   
8 Burke, ‘Reflections on the Revolution in France’, Writings and Speeches, VIII p. 67. 
9 See J.G.A. Pocock, ‘Edmund Burke and the Redefinition of Enthusiasm’ in ed. Keith Michael Baker, The 
French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture (Oxford, 1987). 
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encapsulated the modern subject’s striving for autonomy and mastery.10  Finally, for 
Anthony La Vopa, Burke viewed Jacobin ideology as ‘directly descended from the 
‘enthusiastic’ excesses of Christianity,’ its ‘anti-Christian animus’ notwithstanding.11  
There is admittedly a good deal of evidence to support this scholarly consensus.  
The appearance of what Horace Walpole called the first instance on earth of ‘enthusiasm 
without religion’ in the French Revolution undoubtedly provided an impetus for Burke’s 
forceful critique of enthusiasm in his Reflections on the Revolution in France.12  
Nevertheless, the portrait of Burke as a kind of physician seeking to diagnose and cure 
the disease of enthusiasm is a deeply misleading one, or so I shall argue here.  While it is 
true that Burke participated to a degree in the socio-medical pathologization of 
enthusiasm so prevalent on the eighteenth century, he also resisted it in crucial respects 
and was wary of the dangerous political purposes the invocation of enthusiasm could be 
made to serve.  Burke, I aim to show, was often highly suspicious of attempts to impute 
psychological derangement to ‘enthusiasts’ and ‘fanatics’ and argued instead that the 
causes of fanatical behavior should be sought in material and environmental conditions 
rather than in an overly active or ‘diseased’ imagination.  This suspicion of the 
pathologization of enthusiasm was grounded in an account of human physiology first 
articulated in Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime 
and the Beautiful which dramatically downplayed the extent to which the imagination 
could cause perturbations of the mind on its own.  I further argue that Burke’s hostility to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Stephen K. White, Edmund Burke: Modernity, Politics, and Aesthetics (London, 1994), p. 73. 
11 Anthony J. La Vopa, ‘The Philosopher and the Schwarmer: On the Career of a German Epithet from 
Luther to Kant’ in ed. Anthony J. La Vopa and Lawrence E. Klein, Enthusiasm and Enlightenment in 
Europe, 1650-1850 (San Marino, California, 1998), p. 103.  Jon Mee has similarly argued that Jacobinism 
was to Burke a ‘latter day enthusiasm’ shorn of its religious garb.  See his Romanticism, Enthusiasm and 
Regulation: Poetics and the Policing of Culture in the Romantic Period (Oxford, 2003), p. 8.   
12 Cited in Mee, Romanticism, Enthusiasm and Regulation, p. 84.  
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the enthusiasm of the French revolution stemmed from his fear that, unlike earlier 
enthusiasms, it would not exhaust itself quickly.  Instead, a people taken in by this new 
atheistic enthusiasm might be irrevocably turned away from religious belief, with 
disastrous consequences for political society.      
With these ends in view, the article proceeds in five sections.  In the first I briefly 
map out the socio-medical discourse that associated enthusiasm with a disease of the 
imagination, and its co-optation by Shaftesbury, Hume, Smith, and other thinkers known 
to Burke.  The second section considers Burke’s early intention, evident from an 
unpublished notebook from the 1750’s, to rehabilitate enthusiasm for politics over and 
against its detractors.  In the third section I show how Burke nevertheless expressed 
anxiety about the de-stabilizing effects enthusiasm could have if it spread contagiously 
through the political community at large.  I turn, in the fourth section, to Burke’s writings 
on Ireland to reveal how in this context he adamantly rejected what he considered 
prejudiced and malicious efforts to represent Catholic Irish resistance to Protestant 
domination as the product of deluded enthusiasm or psychological derangement, 
representations that his contemporary David Hume was deeply complicit in. Finally, in 
the closing section I return to Burke’s response to the French Revolution to show how a 
more nuanced appreciation of Burke’s pre-revolutionary theorizations of enthusiasm can 
tell us much about his opposition to events across the English Channel.     
 
(I) Eighteenth century enthusiasm: hypocrisy or disturbance of the imagination? 
 
 
When Burke opened his Reflections on the Revolution in France by drawing an 
unflattering comparison between Reverend Richard Price, a prominent representative of 
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pro-revolutionary opinion in England, and the religious enthusiasts of the mid-
seventeenth century, he deliberately played upon popular suspicion of enthusiasm.  That 
suspicion derived from two influential critiques prevalent at the time.  The first of these 
considered enthusiasm to be a form of hypocrisy, a sort of feigned inspiration used by 
sectarians or false prophets to garner political influence.13 The second critique, 
increasingly common towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, framed 
enthusiasm as kind of malady resulting from what John Locke called a ‘warmed or over 
weaning brain.’14 In this vein, David Hume and Adam Smith depicted enthusiasts as 
narcissists whose overly heated imaginations had rendered unsociable.15  So reconceived, 
the enthusiast appeared under this new medical paradigm to be less a scheming 
dissimulator than a deluded invalid in need of curing.   
By mid-century anxiety about the disruptive effects of enthusiasm had begun to 
give way to optimism that its worst excesses could be successfully tamed and regulated.16  
Adam Smith hoped that a government policy of religious toleration, combined with 
increased education in science (and the burgeoning ‘sciences of man’ in particular), could 
wean people away from the gloomy and melancholic habits of mind that encouraged 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Henry More’s 1662 definition of the enthusiast as one who labors under the ‘misconceit of being 
inspired’ still competed with alongside earlier seventeenth century understandings of enthusiasts as 
cunning dissimulators.  Henry More, Enthusiasmus Triumphatus or, A Brief Discourse of The Nature, 
Causes, kinds, and Cure of Enthusiasm, Augustan Reprint Society. Publication no. 118 (Los Angeles, 
1966), p. 2.   
14 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Alexander Campbell Fraser ed. (New York: 
Barnes and Noble, 2004) p 600. The best account of the medical critique of enthusiasm remains Michael 
Heyd “Be Sober and Reasonable:” The Critique of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth 
Centuries (Leiden, 1995). 
15 The popularity of Locke’s definition can partly be attested to by Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary entry on 
enthusiasm that describes it as a defect arising from a ‘hot imagination.’ On the influence of Locke’s 
definition of enthusiasm on Hume see S.P Foster ‘Different Religions and the Differences they make: 
Hume on the Religious Effects of Religious Ideology’ in Stanley Tweyman ed. David Hume: Critical 
Assessments (London and New York,1995), p. 383. 
16 Mee, Romanticism, Enthusiasm and Regulation, p. 3. 
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enthusiasm.17  However, even absent such remedies, several figures associated with the 
Scottish Enlightenment held out the hope that enthusiasm may ultimately be self-
regulating simply by virtue of the fact that violent and fitful passions could not be 
sustained over long periods of time.  The frequent use of the term ‘paroxysm’ in 
association with enthusiastic raptures captures well this sense of a pathology whose 
violence would be matched only by its brevity.18  Taking it as given that enthusiasm must 
soon burn itself out, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury prescribed benign neglect or gentle 
ridicule as the most effective response of all to its appearance in a community.  He 
praised the policy of ancient Rome where enthusiasts, ‘being let alone,’ rarely ‘raged to 
that degree as to occasion bloodshed, wars, persecutions and devastations in the world.’19  
Hume was equally sanguine concerning the self-limiting nature of enthusiastic outbursts, 
hypothesizing that they must, like ‘thunder and tempest’ quickly ‘exhaust themselves’ 
leaving those effected ‘more gentle and moderate than before.’20  Even the most ‘violent 
enthusiasm,’ he later wrote in his History of England, is ‘too strong for the weak nerves 
to sustain.’21 Hume’s friend Edward Gibbon likewise acknowledged the possibility that a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Oxford, 2008), pp. 336-
441.  For an extensive discussion of the Scottish Enlighteners attempt to counter enthusiasm with the 
‘science of man’ see James Farr, ‘Political Science and the Enlightenment of Enthusiasm’ American 
Political Science Review, 82 (1988).   
18 Enthusiasm was often associated with the paroxysms of hysteria and epilepsy.  Seguin Henry Jackson in 
his Treatise of Sympathy of 1781 was ‘inclined to place under the same head of sympathy, as an irregular 
imitative faculty, those inordinate convulsive actions which arise… on seeing another in the agony of an 
epileptic paroxysm.’ Cited in Evelyn Forget, ‘Evocations of Sympathy: Sympathetic Imagery in 
Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and Physiology’, History of Political Economy 35, Annual Supplement 
(2003), p 287.   
19 Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Lawrence Klein. (Cambridge, 
2000), p. 8.  
20 David Hume, Essays Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, 1985), p. 76-77.  
21 David Hume, The History of England VI (Indianapolis, 1983), p. 142. 
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human character could occasionally succumb to a ‘temporary enthusiasm’ but was 
assured that it would always ‘return by degrees to its proper and natural level.’22  
Before turning to Burke’s texts, it is important to note that not everyone was 
prepared to stigmatize enthusiasts.  In his recent study of fanaticism, Alberto Toscano 
observes that enthusiasm was sometimes defended as a ‘nobler cousin of fanaticism’ that 
should not be tainted by association with its unruly relative.23  Particularly in literary 
circles of eighteenth century Britain, efforts were afoot to rehabilitate enthusiasm as a 
vital spur to human creativity.24  Shaftesbury initiated this campaign by distinguishing the 
dangerous delusions of a religious fanatic from a more ‘noble enthusiasm’ that served to 
elevate human beings above the level of mere animal life.25  He even went so far as to 
declare enthusiasm a ‘natural’ passion, one that could occasionally ‘go awry’ and morph 
into fanaticism, but which at least had the virtue of inspiring us with ‘something more 
than ordinary’ that could raise us ‘above ourselves.’26 
 Exactly what Shaftesbury was aiming at in recuperating enthusiasm in this way 
has been the subject of some scholarly dispute.  The second French translator of his 
Letter Concerning Enthusiasm saw little original in his project, claiming that the 
exploration of a positive ‘poetic enthusiasm’ was already well underway among several 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Edward Gibbon cited in Abraham Phillip Persky, ‘The Changing Concepts of Enthusiasm in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries’ (Dissertation, Stanford, 1959), p. 171.  In her reply to Burke’s 
Reflections on the Revolution in France, Wollstonecraft acknowledged the Shaftesburyian connection 
between enthusiasm and creativity but chose to fold it into a developmental narrative whereby ‘the genuine 
enthusiasm of genius’ was restricted to the ‘infancy of civilization’ before its ‘wings’ were clipped by the 
development of reason.  Wollstonecraft, Vindication of the Rights of Men, p. 28.         
23 Alberto Toscano, Fanaticism: On the Uses of an Idea (London, 2010), p. xxi.   
24 A rehabilitation discussed at length in Shaun Irlam, Elations: The Poetics of Enthusiasm in 18th Century 
Britain (Stanford, 1999).   
25 Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, p. 28 and 352.     
26 Ibid., p. 352. 
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French authors inexplicably overlooked by the ‘English philosopher.’27  Evidence from 
Shaftesbury’s personal diaries, however, suggests that his preferred enthusiasm had a 
strong Stoic dimension.  In a gloss on a passage from Marcus Aurelius, the earl urges 
himself to replace the enthusiasm of ‘false Images’ with an ‘Enthusiasm without Deceit,’ 
a likely reference to the Stoic doctrine that a clear sighted view of the operation of the 
cosmos could result in a rapturous embrace of Providential order.28  Significantly for 
Shaftesbury, therefore, enthusiasm need not be a source of delusion; instead, in its ‘noble’ 
guise it could represent a moment of mental clarity.  Whatever the overriding reason 
behind it, however, Shaftesbury’s revaluation of enthusiasm forms an important part of 
the backdrop against which Burke’s own critical engagement with enthusiasm, to which 
we now turn, must be considered.    
 
 
(II) Burke’s cautious rehabilitation of enthusiasm  
 
Burke’s initial ambitions were literary and his early days in London saw him 
engage with several thinkers grappling with the new sensationalist currents in moral 
philosophy including Adam Smith, whose Shaftesbury-inspired Theory of Moral 
Sentiments Burke reviewed positively for the Annual Register in 1759.  Two years 
previous Burke had made his own contribution to these debates through his Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful.  As Frans de 
Bruyn has recently noted, the argument of Book II, Section IV of the Philosophical 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 M. Lacomb cited in Jan Goldstein, ‘Enthusiasm or Imagination? Eighteenth-Century Smear Words in 
Comparative National Context’, Huntington Library Quarterly 60 (1997), p. 48. 
28 Shaftesbury,  ‘The Askemata’ in ed. Wolfram Benda, Christine Jackson-Holzberg, Friedrich A. Uehlein 
and Erwin Woff, Complete Works, Selected Letters and Posthumous Writings II, 5 (Stuttgard, 2007), p. 
217. 
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Enquiry provided ample fodder to the numerous critics mentioned above who wished to 
present Burke as an enthusiast incapable of checking his excessively florid language.29  
There Burke insists that, when trying to move the passions of an audience, a speaker or 
writer should prefer obscurity of language over clarity, which is an ‘enemy to all 
enthusiasms whatsoever.’30 A ‘fanatic preacher’ will therefore hold great sway over his 
listeners, Burke continues, precisely because his ravings are so indistinct.31 Were the 
preacher’s visions rendered more exact, then the gain in clarity would be accompanied by 
a dampening of his affective power. As those who satirized him as an enthusiast would 
have keenly noted, Burke thus indirectly pays homage to the unique persuasive power of 
the religiously inflamed.    
These remarks in the Philosophical Enquiry fall a long way short of an 
endorsement of enthusiasm, of course.  A notebook from the 1750’s, however, contains 
firmer evidence that Burke, like Shaftesbury, was interested in rehabilitating enthusiasm 
and rescuing those who lay claim to inspiration from popular derision.  The notebook, 
first published in 1957 by H.V.F. Somerset as A notebook of Edmund Burke, contains a 
fragmentary essay entitled ‘Religion of no Efficacy Considered as a State Engine.’ In that 
essay Burke bemoans the fact that many clergy live in fear of being ‘shamed and 
frightened at the Imputation of enthusiasm’ and reassures them instead that 
God has been pleased to give Mankind an Enthusiasm to 
Supply the Want of Reason; and truly, Enthusiasm comes 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Frans De Bruyn, ‘‘Expressive Uncertainty:’ Edmund Burke’s Theory of the Sublime and Eighteenth 
Century Conceptions of Metaphor’ in ed. Koen Vermier and Michael Fuch Deckard The Science of 
Sensibility: Reading Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry (London: 2012), p. 274. 
30 Burke, ‘Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful’, Writings 
and Speeches I, pp. 232-233. 
31 Ibid., p. 233.!
! 11!
nearer the great and comprehensive Reason in its effects, 
though not in the Manner of Operation, than the Common 
Reason does; which works on confined, narrow, common, and 
therefore plausible Topics.  The former is the lot of the very 
few.  The latter is common; and fit enough for common affairs 
– to buy and sell, to teach grammar and the like; but it is 
utterly unfit to meddle with Politics, Divinity and Philosophy.  
But Enthusiasm is a sort of instinct, in those that possess it, 
that operates, like all Instincts, better than a mean species of 
Reason.32 
 
As the private musings of a young man (Burke was in his twenties when he wrote them) 
we should be cautious not to overstate the significance of these lines.  Nevertheless, there 
are several striking elements of Burke’s description of enthusiasm that should be marked.  
The first is that Burke considers the relationship between enthusiasm and reason to be 
complementary rather than antithetical.  Instead of taking for granted the usual eighteenth 
century opposition between reason and enthusiasm, Burke posits the latter as supplying 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Edmund Burke, A notebook of Edmund Burke: Poems, Characters, Essays and Other Sketches in the 
Hands of Edmund and William Burke now Printed for the First Time in their Entirety and Edited by H.V.F. 
Somerset (Cambridge, 1957) p. 68.  As Richard Bourke has recently observed, Somerset’s title is 
misleading in that the notebook in question is only one of several kept by William Burke.  Several of the 
essays in this particular notebook were authored by Edmund and some were even written in his own hand.  
See Richard Bourke, ‘Party, Parliament, and Conquest in Newly Ascribed Burke Manuscripts’, The 
Historical Journal 55 (2012), p. 620.   Somerset considers the passage cited here to be ‘almost certainly by 
Edmund Burke.’ Somerset, A Notebook of Edmund Burke, p. 65.  The general argument of ‘Religion of no 
Efficacy Considered as a State Engine’ is that religion cannot be made to serve the ends of politics.  
Burke’s point, I believe, is that it is an affront to religion to reduce its value to political utility. But this does 
not exclude the possibility that those endowed with enthusiasm may be uniquely equipped to perform 
extraordinary political feats.           
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the ‘want’ of the former.33  Later in the same essay he describes their relationship as 
mutually supportive, recommending that we ‘use our Enthusiasm to elevate and expand 
our Reasoning; and our Reasoning to check the roving of our Enthusiasm.’34   
Second, there is a notable ambiguity in the passage concerning what exactly 
enthusiasm is and who is affected by it.  Burke begins by defining enthusiasm not as an 
exceptional moment of divine inspiration, but as a permanent gift bequeathed by God to 
human beings for their continuous use.  The idea that enthusiasm may be a constitutive 
part of human psychology rather than an isolated instance of divine intervention similarly 
bears the mark of Shaftesbury, for whom enthusiasm could refer to ‘whatever was 
sublime in human passions.’35 By the end of the passage, however, Burke has taken to 
calling it an ‘instinct’ that not everyone possesses to the same degree.  While most of us 
muddle through the more banal tasks of life with a help of a narrow, petty form of reason, 
‘those that possess’ the instinct of enthusiasm are fit to emulate the ‘very few’ whose 
‘great and comprehensive Reason’ equips them for higher sorts of tasks in more exalted 
domains.  By declaring it to be an instinct, Burke naturalizes enthusiasm, while leaving 
open the possibility that it may be more finely honed in some people than in others.     
 Third, not to be missed is Burke’s inclusion of politics as one of the exalted 
domains within which the enthused may excel.  Far from locating the trucking and 
bartering of political life in the province of ‘common affairs,’ Burke singles out politics 
as an exclusive arena in which this inspired minority of enthusiasts can display their 
abilities, an arena which presumably should be closed to those ‘utterly unfit to meddle’ in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 On the opposition between reason and enthusiasm in the eighteenth century see Susie I. Tucker, 
Enthusiasm: A Study in Semantic Change (Cambridge, 1972).    
34 Burke, A notebook of Edmund Burke, pp. 68-69.     
35 Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, p. 27.   
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it.  Again, the unorthodox nature of this view is important to underline.36  By entrusting 
politics to enthusiasts, Burke signals a readiness to challenge the common assumption 
that those professing divine inspiration should be marginalized as threats to public order.   
Moreover, by presenting the enthusiasts as a kind of exalted few, he also calls into 
question the frequent association of enthusiasm with what Adam Smith called the 
‘inferior ranks of people.’37 No longer the irrational rage of those excluded from political 
power, enthusiasm for the early Burke is an instinct nourishing a select group of 
politicians.38      
What specific qualities distinguish Burke’s enthusiast from the greater part of 
mankind?  The notebook just discussed offers little further guidance here but in other 
writings of the same period Burke is more forthcoming with examples of different sorts 
of enthusiasts and the feats they are capable of.  The Account of the European Settlements 
in America, co-authored with his close friend and possible distant relative William Burke, 
is particularly rich in this regard.39  In this brief narration of the European colonization of 
the Americas, the Burkes invoke the power of enthusiasm for a variety of explanatory !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Michael W. McConnell calls Burke’s choice of words in this passage ‘remarkable’ precisely because 
enthusiasm was considered a ‘term of opprobrium’ politically.  See his ‘Edmund Burke’s Tolerant 
Establishment’ in ed. Noel B. Reynolds and W. Cole Durham Religious Liberty in Western Thought (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan, 2003), p. 208. 
37 Smith, Wealth of Nations, p. 436.    
38 As Richard Bourke has noted, Burke would repeatedly highlight the need for a ‘natural aristocracy’ to 
guarantee public virtue.  These passages suggest that Burke saw enthusiasts as potential candidates for such 
an elite.  Richard Bourke, ‘Edmund Burke and Enlightenment Sociability’, History of Political Thought 
XXI (2000), p. 640.   
39 Edmund Burke and William Burke, An Account of the European Settlements in America: containing an 
accurate description of their extent, climate, productions, trade, genius, and dispositions of their 
inhabitants, the interests of the several powers of Europe with respect to those settlements, and their 
political and commercial views with regard to each other. A new edition, illustrated with maps (New ed. 
London, 1808. The Making of the Modern World. Gale, 2011). Although the work was a collaborative 
effort, there is a growing consensus that Edmund Burke should be considered the preeminent voice.  F.P. 
Lock goes so far as to attribute ‘any remark of superior insight’ to Edmund. F.P. Lock. Edmund Burke 
Vol.1 1730-1784 (Oxford, 2008), p. 127.  Richard Bourke follows Lock in assuming that the ‘philosophical 
contributions’ of the text ‘belong to Edmund.’  See his ‘Edmund Burke and the Politics of Conquest’ 
Modern Intellectual History 4 (2007), p. 425.       
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purposes, adopting different conventional understandings of the concept as appropriate. 
For the most part, the Burkes discuss enthusiasm in the sense we find in the notebook, 
that is, as a form of instinct that enables individuals to take on challenges that usually lie 
beyond common human comprehension.  For example, the intrepidity of Christopher 
Columbus is attributed to ‘a sort of enthusiasm’ that enabled him to shun the ‘insults and 
presumptuous judgments of the ignorant’ who doubted him prior to his voyage.40  
In other passages in the Account, however, the Burkes have recourse to earlier 
seventeenth century understandings of enthusiasm as a kind of hypocrisy.  Defined in this 
manner, enthusiasm appears less like an instinct implanted by God than a particular talent 
for dissimulation that can be cultivated for political ends. In a striking move, the Burkes 
even associate enthusiasm with charismatic rule. In their account of pre-conquest Peru, 
the celebrated Inca leader Manco Capac emerges as a ‘prince of great genius’ largely 
because he had that necessary ‘mixture of enthusiasm, which fits a man to make great 
changes, and to be a legislator of a forming nation.’41  The Burkes find in Capac’s 
character a salutary combination of hypocrisy and charisma, one that uniquely equipped 
him to be lawgiver to the hitherto disunited Inca.  Capac ‘united and civilized’ this 
‘dispersed and barbarous’ people, the Burkes suggest, by pretending to be descended 
from the Sun God.  Once the majority of the ‘naturally superstitious’ Inca people had 
bought the ruse they offered him an obedience that was ‘filial rather than slavish.’42  
Capac is genuinely endowed with an instinct for politics which enabled him to 
lure his subjects into thinking that he truly represented a divine presence.  Elsewhere in 
his early writings, however, Burke recognized the ever-present danger that those with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Edmund Burke and William Burke An Account of the European Settlements in America, p 6.  
41 Ibid., p 103. 
42 Ibid., p. 103.  
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such an instinct for governing others could just as easily delude themselves as deceive 
those they purport to rule.  Not every enthusiast was as successful as Capac at keeping 
the notion that he is a vehicle of a higher power in check and subordinate to their political 
aims.  That Burke was alive to this tension between the enthusiast’s need to elevate 
himself above others, and the concomitant risk that such elevation could result in a vain 
subjectivism, is evident from the way it plays itself out in his famous defense of party 
politics, the 1770 Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents.    
In Thoughts Burke appeals to the example of the enthusiast both to illustrate the 
need for politicians to raise themselves above the base concerns of the majority around 
them and at the same time to warn them against the illusion of self-sufficiency to which 
the excessive assertion of independence can lead.   In enumerating the qualities befitting 
a Member of the House of Commons, he is careful to include a ‘spirit of independence 
carried to some degree of enthusiasm’ and contrasts that quality with the servile 
dependence of the man of faction determined to ingratiate himself to the Court rather than 
serve the public good.43  On the other hand, Burke is also keen to point out that a party of 
individuals overly infused with such a spirit of independence would prove collectively 
impotent.  The distance the Parliamentarian cultivates between himself and those around 
him must also bow to some limits (including the constraints set by the balanced 
constitutional order Burke composed Thoughts to defend), partly because effective 
political action requires a disciplined and controlled cooperation among actors committed 
to combating commonly perceived evils.  ‘No man,’ Burke cautions, ‘who is not inflamed 
by vain glory into enthusiasm, can flatter himself that his single, unsupported, desultory, 
unsystematic endeavors are of power to defeat the subtle designs and united Cabals of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Burke, ‘Thoughts on the Present Discontents’, Writings and Speeches II, p. 296.   
! 16!
ambitious citizens.’44  The figure of the enthusiast now serves Burke’s new rhetorical 
purpose of underscoring the dangers that can arise when the spirit of independence is 
corrupted by vanity.  The consequence is to make Burke’s overall rhetorical strategy in 
the Thoughts amount to a (almost) contradictory appeal to the heroic sensibilities of his 
fellow Whig MPs.  To become heroically independent individuals, they must adjust 
themselves to the often un-heroic, communal work of party politics.  
What the foregoing suggests is that Burke’s most effective political enthusiast is 
frequently one in whom the exaltation arising from the belief in a personal divine mission 
competes with a sense of individual limitation.  This all depends, however, on enthusiasm 
remaining the preserve of the exalted few.  The elevation of the enthusiast can be 
achieved only if the majority persists in its ‘narrow, common’ endeavors.   If the same 
sense of exaltation were to spread to the population at large then enthusiasm would 
quickly revert to being a threat to political authority.  As we shall see presently, this fear 
of a contagious enthusiasm was a great source of anxiety for Burke and several of his 
contemporaries.    
 
(III) The horizontal contagion of enthusiasm 
 
Recently scholars have been keen to emphasize Burke’s indebtedness to Scottish 
Enlightenment physiologies of the passions and in particular his endorsement, in the 
Philosophical Enquiry, of a version of the thesis that passions could be transmitted from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Ibid., p. 315.  
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‘one breast to another’ via sympathy.45  This influence extended, I submit, to Burke’s 
own early views on the alarming social consequences that could result from an 
enthusiasm that has become contagious.  Burke’s early appreciation for the enthusiast, 
explored above, was contingent on their sense of exaltation and empowerment remaining 
restricted to those few who could direct their instincts towards laudable political ends.  
Like the Scottish Enlighteners, the idea of that the population at large might become 
endowed with a similar sense of power was a cause for concern for Burke. 
 If we turn once more to the Account we find alongside the Burkes’ appreciation 
for the role of enthusiasm in buttressing vertical relations of authority a fear that its 
horizontal spread could undermine that authority and degenerate into the violent frenzy of 
the mob. The ‘enthusiasm of horror and fury’ that accompanied the Indian ritualized 
torture of prisoners captured in war serves as a particularly graphic illustration of this 
fear.46  In these passages the capacity for enthusiasm to threaten established order is 
signaled by a perverse effect it has on traditional gender roles.  In lines that anticipate 
Burke’s later disgust at the French ‘furies of hell’ leading the October March on 
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45 Burke, ‘Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful’ Writings and 
Speeches I, p. 221. The concept of sympathy, while not unique to the Scottish Enlightenment, nevertheless 
occupied a central place in the debate over moral sensationalism.  Burke scholarship currently abounds 
with commentary on Burkean sympathy.  Jennifer Pitts has made the case that, in Burke’s eyes, ‘a failure of 
sympathy’ on the part of the British public at large was at the root of the colonial travesty in India. See her 
A Turn to Empire:  The Rise of Liberal Imperialism in Britain and France (Princeton, 2005), p. 74.  Luke 
Gibbons similarly locates a Burkean ‘sympathetic sublime’ that allows for trans-cultural acknowledgement 
of suffering and oppression in his Edmund Burke and Ireland: Politics, Aesthetics and the Colonial 
Sublime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) chapter 3.  Daniel I. O’Neill has done most to 
explore the full extent of Burke’s debt to the Scottish Enlightenment in general, although he focuses more 
on Burke’s appropriation of the Scottish stadial theory of history than on the concept of sympathy. See The 
Burke-Wollstonecraft Debate: Savagery, Civilization and Democracy (University Park, Pennsylvania, 
2007). Others have been more inclined to emphasize imitation, another of the links in Burke’s ‘great chain 
of society,’ as the key category in Burke’s social theory. See particularly William R. Musgrave, ‘That 
Monstrous Fiction’: Radical Agency and Aesthetic Ideology in Burke’, Studies in Romanticism, 36 (1997) 
and Terry Eagleton, ‘Aesthetics and Politics in Edmund Burke’, History Workshop 28 (1989), pp. 53-62.  
Burke refers to the ‘great chain of society’ at ‘Philosophical Enquiry’ Writings and Speeches  II, p. 220.    
46 Edmund Burke and William Burke, An Account of the European Settlements in America, p. 149. 
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Versailles, the Indian women who participated in the collective torture are charged with 
forgetting ‘the human as well as the female nature’ and with transforming themselves 
‘into something worse than furies.’47 Far from being a divine instinct that elevates human 
beings, enthusiasm in this perverted form is a force for degeneracy. 
  If Burke shared the Scots’ morbid fascination with the destructive potential of 
contagious enthusiasm, two further pieces of evidence from the Account suggest he also 
shared Hume’s faith that such contagions were bound to quickly subside and leave a 
more ‘gentle and moderate’ politics in their wake.48 First, loud echoes of Hume’s position 
on the temporality of enthusiasm are discernible from the Burkes’ treatment of the 
Puritan community in Salem, Massachusetts.  In telling the story of the frenzied witch-
hunt that erupted there in 1692, the Burkes revert to the Scottish Enlightenment 
stereotype of the enthusiast as a deluded figure infected with a malady that could be 
easily transmitted to others. Once the delusion that witchcraft was present in the 
community took hold it ‘spread like some epidemical disease’ with the fury of those 
afflicted augmenting ‘in proportion as this gloom of imagination increased.’49  Ultimately 
however, as Hume’s thesis would predict, this ‘last paroxysm of the puritanick 
enthusiasm in New England’ was self-limiting.  Once the initial ‘violent fit’ was over, the 
Burkes write, the people of Salem quickly grew ‘much like the rest of mankind in their 
manners’ and were much ‘abated of their prosecuting spirit.’50 The implication again is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Ibid., p. 150.  See Burke, ‘Reflections on the Revolution in France’ Writings and Speeches VIII, p. 122.  
This comparison is also made by Daniel I. O’Neill and Margaret Kohn in ‘A Tale of Two Indias: Burke and 
Mill on Empire and Slavery in the West Indies and America’ Political Theory 34 (2006), p. 197.  On 
Burke’s anxiety about the rise of ‘political women’ in the French Revolution see Linda Zerilli, Signifying 
Woman: Culture and Chaos in Rousseau, Burke and Mill (Ithaca,1994), pp. 85 - 90.    
48 Hume, Essays Moral, Political and Literary, p. 76.   
49 Ibid., p. 361 and 363. 
50 Ibid., p. 365. 
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that enthusiasm is as much of a burden on a community as on the nervous system of an 
individual and that in both cases it cannot be expected to last for long. 
The Burkes’ second application of the Humean argument is of potentially greater 
interest.  When accounting for the success of the puritan colonists at Plymouth Rock, they 
find that the same ‘enthusiasm which was reversing everything at home’ and which must 
be considered ‘dangerous in every settled community’ was subsequently converted to ‘a 
principle of life and vigor’ once they arrived in the hostile environment of the New 
World.51  The reason, the Burkes find, is that a community united around a belief in 
divine inspiration eventually could self-impose a strict conformity of ‘exact and sober 
manners’ as ‘a substitute for a proper subordination.’ Without an established system of 
manners to subvert, the enthusiasts had nothing to direct their destructive ferocity against 
and so diverted it into the constructive task of establishing a new code of manners stricter 
than anything they had challenged in England. A force subversive of authority in one 
context could, with time, shore it up in another.  
  
(IV) Ireland and the enthusiasm of the oppressed 
 
We have already seen how Burke from early on shared the unease of many of his 
contemporaries about the sympathetic contagiousness of enthusiasm, even if he also 
shared their optimism that the affliction and social disruption it occasioned were fated to 
be short lived.  If we transport these insights into some of Burke’s writings on Ireland, 
however, a far more complex picture emerges.  A pervasive theme of those writings is 
that enthusiasm arises not only from imaginations heated by religious fervor but also as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Edmund Burke and William Burke, An Account of the European Settlements in America, p. 353. 
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the unanticipated by-product of mismanaged government.  Ireland’s history of violent 
religious strife seems at first glance to make it a perfect illustrative case of the ills 
attending religious fanaticism.  As I show presently, however, Burke denied that the 
medical paradigm of enthusiasm could be applied there without first allowing for 
circumstances unique to Irish society.  Moreover, he was painfully aware of the malicious 
ends that the false imputation of enthusiasm to its inhabitants had served.  To illustrate 
exactly how Burke diverged from the Scottish Enlighteners on this subject, I take as my 
point of departure an actual disagreement that took place between Burke and Hume in 
London over the latter’s treatment of Irish religious violence in his History of England.  
Far from being of merely anecdotal interest, I maintain, this quarrel offers a gateway to 
understanding Burke’s keen understanding of the complex relationship between historical 
narratives and the violence they purport to explain.    
At the origin of the dispute between Burke and Hume was the latter’s account of 
the massacre of English Protestants in Ireland by local Catholics in 1641, an event that 
marked the beginning of a period of unrest culminating in Cromwell’s invasion of 1649.  
Hume makes clear in his History that he considered this violence to be entirely ‘without 
provocation,’ an act of ‘cruelty derived from no cause.’52  Given Hume’s methodological 
commitment to understanding, via sympathy, the motivations of the historical agents he 
describes, this was no small charge. In this case, Hume suggests that the impossibility of 
sympathetic identification on the part of the historian derived from the fact that there was 
little human to identify with.  Even ‘the pity, inherent in all human breasts,’ Hume writes, 
was ‘destroyed by that contagion of example which transports men beyond all the usual 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Hume, History of England V (Indianapolis, 1983), p. 342. 
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motives of conduct and behavior.’53  With all conventional explanations seemingly 
unavailable to him, Hume attributes the massacre to the spread of an ‘enraged 
superstition’ which, when mixed with Anglophobic prejudices, had reduced the Irish to 
the level of the ‘inhuman.’54  So far beyond the pale of humanity were these ‘bigoted 
assassins,’ Hume relates with barely concealed disgust, that they took ‘joy and exultation’ 
in telling their victims that their deaths would be swiftly followed by torment in hell.55          
Hume’s description of the 1641 massacre incited uproar in Ireland and a letter 
writing campaign was quickly launched to convince him to revise the account in later 
editions.56  The stakes were not insignificant.  Hume’s History had nearly instantly 
become one of the most widely read books of the eighteenth century and, what was 
worse, the author’s reputation for philosophical impartiality lent greater weight to his 
descriptions.  Most importantly for our purposes here, Burke initially supported this 
campaign and even encouraged Thomas Leland, an old friend from Trinity College 
Dublin, to publish a more impartial history in response (though he distanced himself from 
the work that eventually resulted).  According to Robert Bisset, his earliest biographer, 
Burke also took the fight to Hume directly and would ‘battle’ him on the topic when they 
would meet at private homes in London.57  The dispute even took on a personal 
dimension, as Burke believed himself to be the specific target of a footnote in the fourth 
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53 Hume, History of England V. p. 342 
54 Ibid., p. 341.   
55 Ibid., p. 343. 
56 John Curry and Charles O’Conor of Balanagare, the leaders of this campaign, even wrote to Helvetius to 
get him to convince his friend Hume to change his mind.  For a full account see David Berman, ‘David 
Hume on the 1641 Revolution in Ireland’, Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 65 (1976).  On the specific 
role played by Burke in the campaign see Walter D. Love, ‘Edmund Burke and an Irish Historiographical 
Controversy’ in Theory and History 2 (1962).   
57 Robert Bisset, The Life of Edmund Burke, Comprehending an Impartial Account of his Literary and 
Political Efforts and a Sketch of the Conduct and Character of his most Eminent Associates, Coadjutors, 
and Opponents (London, 1798), p. 195.   
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volume of Hume’s History portraying deniers of the 1641 massacre as ‘men beyond the 
reach of argument or reason.’58  
How are we to interpret Burke’s reaction to Hume’s alleged historical distortions?  
The otherwise sympathetic Bissett does so by essentially siding with Hume, dismissing 
Burke’s intransigence on the topic as a lapse ‘unworthy’ of his character.59  Burke’s most 
recent biographer, F.P Lock, distributes blame more evenly, calling both sides ‘equally 
and oppositely prejudiced.’60  On Lock’s line of interpretation Burke’s own Irish origins 
and family connections (his mother, sister and several of his uncles were Catholic) 
presumably prejudiced him to such an extent that he could easily rationalize away 
religiously sectarian violence.  If correct, the disagreement could be safely dismissed as a 
marginal and insignificant squabble between two thinkers, perhaps neither of who were 
as impartial as they imagined themselves to be.   
  While it may have a superficial plausibility, this interpretation obscures the 
political stakes at the heart of the disagreement.  While the other Irish historians who 
implored Hume to revise his account focused principally on factual errors – the numbers 
killed had been grossly exaggerated, for instance – Burke, I submit, was just as 
preoccupied with the assumed connections between religious delusion and violence 
undergirding the predominant explanations of the massacre.  In other words, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Hume, History IV, p. 395n.  According to Bisset, Burke ‘never forgave’ Hume for this perceived insult 
and nursed a grudge against him right up until his death in 1796.  Bisset, Life of Edmund Burke, p. 197.  
Boswell provides further evidence of Burke’s hostility to the Scot, noting his haughty disdain for the 
autobiography Hume composed on his own deathbed and his famous refusal, recorded by Smith, to 
embrace Christianity even at death.  See Stephen Miller, ‘The Death of Hume’ in The Wilson Quarterly 19 
(1995), p. 34.               
59 Ibid., p. 195.  Other of Burke’s early biographers were less quick to judge.  James Prior, in his 1878 
study, merely records that there were ‘animated discussions’ and ‘differences of opinion’ on the topic 
between the two thinkers.  See his Life of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke (London, 1878).  Robert H. 
Murray notes that an Irish Archbishop’s fondness for Hume’s History would not have ‘recommended’ him 
to Burke. Murray, Edmund Burke, A Biography (Oxford, 1931), p. 94. 
60 Lock, Edmund Burke Vol.1 1730-1784, p. 188.  Lock does concede, however, that Burke’s take on the 
massacre has fared better over the long run than Hume’s.   
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disagreement over Hume’s account of the events of 1641 gestures towards a more general 
discord between Hume and Burke concerning the nature of religious violence in a context 
of domination and political exclusion.  
 The closest thing we have to a written response to Hume from Burke is a passage 
from the Tracts Relative to the Popery Laws, a damning critique of the anti-Catholic 
Penal Laws that Burke commenced (but never finished) around 1761.  In it, Burke 
condemns the ‘miserable performances which go about under the names of histories of 
Ireland’ and which were highly complicit in reinforcing the common belief among British 
administrators that the Irish were so inherently inclined towards sedition that only more 
draconian government and their continued civic exclusion could prevent future revolts.61 
Burke does not list Hume’s own History among these ‘miserable performances,’ but two 
of the three histories he does mention (Temple’s The Irish Rebellion and Clarendon’s The 
History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in Ireland) were among Hume’s most cited 
sources.62 (Hume’s admiration for Temple in particular is clear from his description of 
him, in volume VI of the History, as the only considerable writer of his age that managed 
to keep himself ‘unpolluted by that inundation of vice and licentiousness, which 
overwhelmed’ Britain in the seventeenth century.)63  In any case, it is the recognizably 
Humean argument that the massacre was an act of unprovoked violence fueled by 
religious delusions that serves as the principal target of Burke’s polemic.  Burke’s 
rhetorical strategy in the passage is to initially concede the possibility that human beings !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Burke, ‘Tracts Relative to the Popery Laws’ Writings and Speeches IX, p. 478. 
62 Richard Bourke considers it ‘unimaginable’ that Burke did not study Hume’s History.  Bourke, ‘Party, 
Parliament, and Conquest in Newly Ascribed Burke Manuscripts’, p. 638. 
63 Hume, History VI, p. 544.  The subtitle of Temple’s book on the rebellion – a History of the beginnings 
and first progress of the general rebellion of 1641. Together with the barbarous cruelties and bloody 
massacres which ensued thereupon – suggests that it influenced Hume’s own characterization of the 
massacre as an act of ‘barbarity.’  Hume, History V, p. 343.    
! 24!
may be drawn into fanaticism in some cases, before making two important counter 
claims: 
First, that such a temper [of fanaticism] can never become universal, or 
last for a long time… The majority of men are not bigots; they are not 
willing to sacrifice, on every vain imagination that superstition or 
enthusiasm holds forth, or that zeal and piety recommend, the certain 
possession of their temporal happiness.  And if such a spirit has been at 
any time roused in a society, after it has had its paroxysm it commonly 
subsides and is quiet, and is even the weaker for the violence of its first 
exertion: security and ease are its mortal enemies.  But secondly, if 
anything can tend to revive and keep it up, it is to keep alive the passions 
of men by ill usage.  This is enough to irritate the most desperate 
enterprises; it certainly will inflame, darken, and render more dangerous 
the spirit of bigotry in those who are possessed by it.64  
 
The redolence of Hume’s theorization of enthusiasm is strong in this passage, 
particularly in Burke’s emphasis on the paroxysmal nature of the enthusiastic spirit.  
Equally apparent, however, is the challenge Burke issues to that theorization.  In the first 
place, Burke casts doubt on the argument that an inflamed imagination on its own can be 
a powerful motivator of human behavior, particularly if the action it encourages is 
contrary to one’s ‘temporal’ interest.   Second, Burke exposes how Hume’s claim that 
enthusiasm will quickly ‘exhaust itself leaving the air more serene than before’ tacitly 
assumes that the enthusiasts themselves will be allowed, either by the weakness or !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Burke, ‘Tracts Relative to the Popery Laws’, Writings and Speeches IX, pp. 479-480.  
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toleration of government, to vent themselves freely for a time.  For peoples subject to an 
overbearingly harsh regime, however, this assumption does not obtain because the 
‘security and ease’ needed to calm the spirit of fanaticism is perpetually missing. 
Suffering under an ‘unparalleled oppression’ their enthusiasm is artificially kept ‘alive.’65 
The experience of continual domination, in other words, alters the temporality of 
enthusiastic outbursts, prolonging them past the usual time required for them to dissipate.      
There is evidence that Burke considered writing a history of Ireland himself at 
this time and gathered some initial archival materials towards that end.66  And although 
he eventually entrusted Leland with that task, the Tract itself takes important steps 
towards improving on the work of the ‘miserable’ historians by restoring to the 
perpetrators of the massacre their status as human agents with recognizably human 
motives.  The theory of the passions that Burke first articulated in the Philosophical 
Enquiry is, I maintain, crucial to his case against them.  From the perspective of that 
theory, Hume’s assumption that the Catholics’ violent actions had ‘derived from no 
cause’ other than religious delusion is untenable for the simple reason that the 
imagination alone is rarely sufficient to rouse human beings out of their usual torpor.  
‘The human mind,’ Burke writes in the Enquiry, is most of the time in a ‘state of 
indifference.’67  Only feelings such as pain or pleasure – feelings the imagination on its 
own cannot simulate – are capable of disturbing it and they in turn are produced by 
external physical stimuli.68  Moreover, because feelings are pre-cognitive, there is little !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Ibid., p 479.   
66 The possibility that Burke himself was engaged in writing his own history of Ireland in 1761 is explored 
by John C. Weston Jr. in his ‘Edmund Burke’s Irish History: a Hypothesis’ PMLA 77 (1962). 
67 Burke, ‘Philosophical Enquiry,’ Writings and Speeches I, p. 213.   
68 Aris Sarafianos has similarly emphasized the materialism and environmentalism at the core of Burke’s 
theory.  See his ‘Pain, Labor and the Sublime: Medical Gymnastics and Burke’s Aesthetics’ in 
Representations 91 (2005). 
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prospect for the mind to mistake of their nature. ‘People are not liable to be mistaken in 
their feelings,’ Burke insists, even if they may reason incorrectly about them.69  And 
because the operation of the human body is providentially ordained to be the same for all 
people, everyone, regardless of cultural or religious background, experiences these 
feelings in a uniform manner.70  In short, to attribute to the imagination the power to 
generate violent passions ex nihilo, independently of an external physical or material 
stimulus, is to overstate its potency.71 What this suggests is that the fundamental causes 
of mental disturbances of the sort commonly associated with enthusiasm should always 
be sought in the sufferer’s environment and the feelings such an environment is likely to 
generate in all human beings.   
We cannot know the details of the objections Burke voiced directly to Hume at 
their meetings in London, and the limited amendments to the account of the 1641 
massacre in the posthumously published 1778 edition of the History show how little 
Hume had ultimately been impressed by his Irish critics.72  But it is also likely that Hume 
assumed, pace Burke, that he had in fact taken adequate account of the unique 
explanatory problems posed by the civil exclusion of Catholics.  In the 1741 essay ‘Of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Burke, ‘Philosophical Enquiry’ Writings and Speeches I, p. 211.  As Hanna Pitkin puts it, for Burke, 
‘people are seldom mistaken when they perceive a pain or symptom.’ Hanna Pitkin The Concept of 
Representation (Berkeley, 1972), p. 183. 
70 Burke’s account of human emotional life is therefore both naturalist and empirical, while at the same 
time infused with religious significance.  As Richard Bourke puts it, the constitution of the human mind has 
‘been designed by Providence with uniform reactions to specific stimuli.’ Richard Bourke, ‘Pity and Fear: 
Providential Sociability in Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry’ in ed. Koen Vermier and Michael Fuch Deckard 
The Science of Sensibility: Reading Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry, p. 155. 
71 Christopher Reid notes that Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry was frequently criticized for belittling the 
creative capacity of the imagination.  See his Edmund Burke and the Practice of Political Writing (Dublin, 
1985), p. 192.  For a superb in-depth account of Burke’s demotion of the imagination to a state of 
dependency upon the senses see Vanessa Ryan, ‘The Physiological Sublime: Burke’s Critique of Reason’ 
in Journal of the History of Ideas 62 (2001).   
72 David Berman notes that Hume ‘decisively changed his mind’ on the question of the numbers killed in 
the 1770 edition of the History and made some minor modifications of tone.  Many of these alterations 
were themselves were then subsequently altered for the 1778 edition in a manner that suggested a reversion 
to Hume’s original position.  Berman, ‘David Hume on the 1641 Revolution in Ireland,’ p. 107.   
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Superstition and Enthusiasm’ Hume had contrasted the volatility and excessive 
individualism of the enthusiast with the deferential and submissive qualities of 
superstitious Catholics who ‘groan’ under the ‘dominion of priests.’  By rendering men 
‘tame and submissive,’ Catholic superstition was, Hume had hypothesized, normally 
supportive of political order and ‘Kingly power.’73  In the unique context of an Ireland 
effectively ruled by a Protestant Ascendancy, however, the relationship Hume posited 
between superstition and authority is inverted.  The same tendency to inculcate 
subservience that had made Catholicism a boon to French absolutism paved the way for 
Irish Catholics to require ‘but a hint’ from their ‘leaders and priests’ to offer violent 
resistance to Protestant rule.74 In those who carried out the massacre, therefore, Hume 
appeared to find a curious and toxic combination of the ‘enraged’ imagination he had 
associated with enthusiasm and the timorousness of superstitious people under clerical 
subordination.75  Though Burke and Hume disagreed in substance over the 1641 
massacre, therefore, they both nevertheless perceived that supposedly uniform 
connections between enthusiasm and disorder play out in dramatically different ways in 
contexts such as Ireland’s.        
The longer Burke spent in England the more distance he placed between himself 
and the efforts back in Ireland to correct the historical record on the 1641 massacre.  This 
led many in Ireland, such as the historians John Curry and Charles O’Conor, to believe 
that Burke was becoming co-opted by the discourse of the British political elite he was 
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striving to join.76  While Burke may well have begun to disassociate himself from his 
Irish correspondents for fear of compromising his burgeoning political career, this charge 
might not have been entirely fair.  Richard Bourke’s recent attribution to Burke of the 
manuscript ‘Hints of Ireland,’ (a brief essay composed around 1757 dispelling the notion 
that the English gained dominion over the Irish by right of conquest) shows that Burke’s 
challenge to flawed Irish historiography in the 1761 Tract was not an isolated occurrence.  
If Burke really was, in F.P. Lock’s words, ‘re-invent[ing] himself as an Englishman’ in 
the 1750’s and 60’s, sidelining his interests in Ireland as he did so, then the process was 
probably gradual.77  More certain is that the issue of enthusiasm in Ireland only returned 
to the forefront of Burke’s concerns in the 1790’s, after a long hiatus.  For at that 
moment, the possibility that religious persecution could render the Irish receptive to new 
and odious enthusiasms from revolutionary France gave the question renewed urgency.78   
In the Letter to Richard Burke (one of several letters on Ireland written in the 
1790s possibly intended for publication) Burke alluded again to 1641, this time 
condemning rebels more unequivocally as having perpetrated a ‘crime’ of ‘unpardonable 
magnitude,’ while nevertheless insisting that contemporary Catholics should not be 
deemed inheritors of their guilt.79  This shift towards a more moralizing tone 
notwithstanding, there is a striking degree of rhetorical continuity between the 1790’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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letters and the earlier Tract, with Burke once again upending explanations of religious 
violence that hinged on a questionable religious psychology.  In the 1792 letter to the MP 
Sir Hercules Langrishe we find the same determination to separate out ‘the real cause [of 
religious violence] from the ill effects of the passion they may excite.’80 Burke even 
moves, in the same text, beyond a re-diagnosis of the nature and origin of religious 
violence in Ireland towards scrutiny of the prescribed ‘cure.’  As we have seen, the 
historians that Burke attacks in the Tract had drawn on and reinforced the belief that the 
Irish Catholics had an immutable predilection towards violence which necessitated their 
permanent exclusion from full citizenship. The Letter to Langrishe ridicules the pseudo-
psychology underlying this preferred remedy of the ruling Protestant Ascendency by 
exposing it as a cause of the very illness it purported to cure.  Excluding the Irish from all 
civil rights and privileges, he writes, ‘is not a cure for so terrible a distemper of mind as 
they are pleased to suppose in their countrymen.’81  On the contrary, Burke continues, 
‘participation in those privileges’ may ‘be itself a remedy for some mental disorders.’82   
The latter sentence can be read as carrying a dual meaning.  On the one hand, 
Burke implies that the full civil inclusion of Catholics will remove the chief cause of 
violently anti-Protestant sentiment in the minds of Catholics.  There was, however, 
another ‘mental disorder,’ that Burke had his eye on in the 1790’s, a disorder against 
which a placated Catholic population could potentially have provided an ‘invincible 
dyke.’83  It is to this mental disorder, or rather Burke’s analysis of it, that we now turn.      
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(V) Enthusiasts old and new: the unique danger of Jacobin atheism 
 
 
It [the Reflections on the Revolution in France] might be the 
means of saving, one nation at least, from what I think a terrible 
contagion.  
 
         Burke, Letter to Lord Fitzwilliam, June 179184 
   
 
Who would have imagined that atheism could have produced one of the most 
violently operative principles of fanaticism? 
 
                                   Burke, Remarks on the Policy of the Allies85  
 
 
If I am correct in arguing that Burke was sensitive to the malevolent ends the 
imputation of enthusiasm could serve, what then are we to make of his own invocations 
of enthusiasm in his response to the French Revolution?  Taken together, his early 
appreciation of some benign effects of enthusiasm, and his effort to understand (if not 
pardon) those who are driven to a more fanatical enthusiasm through legitimate 
grievances, might have inclined him to look favorably on the ‘first instance on earth of 
enthusiasm without religion.’86  This was the view of his Whig party colleagues, many of 
whom were dismayed at Burke’s condemnation of the Revolution precisely because they 
expected him to see the French struggle against absolutist monarchy as likewise produced 
by natural feelings rather than over heated brains.  Even Thomas Paine wrote to Burke in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
84 Burke, Correspondence VI, p. 272/273.  Edward Gibbon agreed, declaring the Reflections ‘a most 
admirable medicine against the French disease.’ Private Letters of Edward Gibbon 1753-1794 2 (Adamant 
Media Corporation, 2001), p. 237. 
85 Burke, ‘Policy of the Allies,’ Writings and Speeches VIII, p. 499.   
86 Horace Walpole cited in Mee, Romanticism, Enthusiasm and Regulation, p. 84 (see note 12). 
! 31!
the early days of the Revolution in full expectation that the champion of the oppressed in 
India and America would join his fellow Whigs in welcoming the latest instance of a 
distressed people driven to drastic measures by a regime often considered more 
oppressive than that of Hastings in India.87         
Disappointingly for those Whigs, Burke set out in the opening sections of the 
Reflections to compare the new enthusiasts for the rights of man not to, say, the aggrieved 
Irish rebels of 1641, but to the regicidal Puritans of the same époque.  In making this 
unflattering comparison, Burke also implied that the modern doctrine of the rights of man 
could operate on the human mind in much the same manner as religious doctrines and 
ultimately produce similar ill effects on society. In the Second Letter on a Regicide Peace 
he allows that although ‘religion’ was among ‘the most powerful causes of enthusiasm’ 
there was ‘no doctrine whatever, on which men can warm, that is not capable of the same 
effect.’88  On this evidence, it is tempting to conclude that the enthusiasm Burke objected 
to in Reflections was a secularized version of an atavistic religious fanaticism that had 
convulsed England over a century before.  It is difficult to doubt, for example, F.P Lock’s 
claim that the principal purpose behind Burke’s response to Price’s revolutionary 
harangue from the pulpit was to ‘deny its modernity.’89  
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Nevertheless, in what remains of this article I wish to qualify this interpretation of 
Burke’s strategy.  While Burke did seek to draw certain parallels between religious and 
secular enthusiasts, it was the radical and alarming novelty of the latter that he sought 
most to convey to his readers.  Previous scholarship has already gone some way to 
marking the conceptual distance between the new enthusiasm and the old in Burke’s 
thought.  For Daniel I. O’Neill, to take a recent example, Burke fretted that the spread of 
the new atheistic enthusiasm would bring about nothing less than the collapse of Western 
Civilization by attacking its two principal pillars, the Church and the aristocracy.90  But 
while the general role it played within Burke’s political analysis of the French Revolution 
has been studied, less has been said about the specific tendencies that allow atheistic 
enthusiasm to reach a level of destructiveness far surpassing earlier Christian enthusiasms 
that had also threatened the established Church and, in the guise of the Levellers, the 
nobility.  Two in particular stand out: first, the tendency for religious indifference to drift 
into a persecutory attitude towards religion itself and, second, the tendency for atheistic 
enthusiasm to perpetuate itself rather than follow the usual pattern of effervescence and 
subsidence that characterized enthusiasms of other eras.           
 
The trouble with indifference  
Burke was convinced that ‘the enthusiasts of this rising sect’ would be far more 
intolerant and persecutory than any of their religious counterparts.91  Consider the 
comparison he draws between Price and Hugh Peters, the Independent minister who 
agitated for the execution of Charles I from the pulpit at the close of the civil war of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
90 O’Neill, The Burke-Wollstonecraft Debate, pp. 197-199.   
91 Burke, ‘Letter to Richard Burke’,!Writings and Speeches IX, p. 647.!
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1640s.  The casting of Price as reviving the ‘pulpit style’ of Peters would seem to 
suggests a strong affinity between the old enthusiasts and their modern counterparts.  
However, a closer examination of the immediate context of this comparison in the 
Reflections complicates such a reading.  For at the very moment he establishes the 
parallel between the two ministers, Burke immediately places some critical distance 
between them.  Whereas Peters was an arch-type of the religious fanatic, Price is a 
zealous Reverend ‘of a curious character’ because he is at the same time ‘perfectly 
indifferent’ concerning matters of religious doctrine.92  Such indifference, Burke later 
suggests, makes of Price and his cohort a minority among the English people, who are 
generally ‘protestants not from indifference but from zeal.’93  This criticism of Price’s 
indifference provides us with an early clue as to one source of Burke’s particular hostility 
to the kind of enthusiasm Price represented.  Burke’s worry, here and elsewhere, is that 
those who are indifferent towards religion will do little to defend it against the spread of 
atheism - the ‘great political evil of our time’ - and are more likely to be recruited to the 
cause of persecuting religion as such.94  If, as he argues in his Second Letter on a 
Regicide Peace, ‘they who do not love religion hate it’ then there can be no habitable 
middle ground between religious zeal on the one hand and atheistic persecution of 
religion on the other.95  Once a people has ‘degenerate[d] into indifference’ then a further 
descent into ‘downright atheism’ is highly likely.96 
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Significantly, this argument is not particular to Burke’s response to the French 
Revolution but can be found in several of the 1790s writings on Ireland.  This is far from 
coincidental.  In the case of both Ireland and France, Burke perceived a connection 
between religious indifference and persecution.  In the Letter to Langrishe he looked with 
foreboding at the spread of ‘total indifference to every thing positive in matters of 
doctrine’ that, if continued, would ‘play the game of that sort of active, proselytizing and 
persecuting atheism, which is the disgrace and calamity of our time.’97  Jennifer Pitts has 
argued that Burke’s letters on Ireland in the 1790s reveal that he had come to consider the 
Protestant oppression of Catholics less a case of religiously motivated persecution than of 
a national chauvinistic oppression that employed religion as a pretext.98  But if we 
consider these letters in the light of Burke’s simultaneous anxieties about the spread of 
atheism in France then religious zeal (or rather its absence) does still occupy a central 
place in his analysis.   
Particularly in the Letter to Richard Burke it becomes clear that the absence of 
religious zeal on behalf of the ruling Protestant elite served as a key permissive cause of 
persecution.  In that text, Burke insists that Protestantism in Ireland has no positive 
content independent of its hostility towards Catholicism and has come to define itself ‘not 
by what it is, but by what it is not.’99   As in the case of Price’s doctrinally indifferent 
radicals, Burke makes clear in no uncertain terms that these ‘persecutors, without zeal’ 
are more dangerous than these ‘old persecutors’ who sought to ‘defend or diffuse’ what 
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Practice’ in ed. Susan Mendus The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life (Edinburgh, 1999), p. 37.  
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they considered true religion.100  Burke’s intimation is that the ‘civil excommunication of 
a whole people’ in Ireland might have been at least comprehensible if those enacting it 
sincerely believed themselves to be advancing the cause of their faith.101  Instead, the 
cynical deployment of religion by a Protestant Ascendency who themselves clung to no 
positive religious values serves only to corrode the credibility of religion more generally, 
thereby playing into the hands of proselytizing atheists and making Ascendency policies 
equivalent to the ‘persecution of religion itself.’102   
It might be countered that Burke, far from attacking Protestants for their 
indifference, instead encouraged them to contain their religious zeal, the better to make 
common cause with Catholics against atheists.103  Indeed, in the 1790’s letters Burke 
frequently downplays the significance of theological disputes, hinting that a more relaxed 
attitude towards them could facilitate the creation of a united Christian front.  In the 
Letter to Richard Burke he declares himself willing to ‘abandon to the theologians on all 
sides’ the actual ‘truth or falsehood’ of various items of doctrine, a sentiment echoed five 
years later in a letter to an unknown addressee.104  If the members of the Protestant 
Ascendency would only exhibit similar indifference, Burke seems to imply, then they 
might see how the positive doctrines they share with their co-Christians exceed in 
importance any points of division.   
The problem for Burke, however, is that Protestantism in Ireland has become so 
emptied of positive content that the doctrinal core necessary to motivate a pan-Christian !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100!Ibid., p. 645. 
101 Ibid., p. 656. 
102 Ibid., p. 647. 
103 On Burke’s fervent desire to see Catholics and Protestants so unify see Daniel I. O’Neill The Burke-
Wollstonecraft Debate, p. 199. 
104 Burke, ‘Letter to Richard Burke’, p. 645.  Burke tells the addressee of Letter to Unknown that 
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defensive action against atheism has been reduced to nothing.  Burke stresses that the 
very term ‘Protestant Religion’ has literally been stripped of all meaning in the Irish 
context: ‘We sometimes hear of a Protestant Religion, frequently of a Protestant interest.  
We hear of the latter most frequently, because it has a positive meaning.  The other has 
none.’105  And again five years later: ‘Let every man be as pious as he pleases; and in the 
way that He pleases; but it is agreeable neither to piety nor to policy to give exclusively 
all manner of civil privileges and advantages to a negative Religion; - (such is the 
Protestant without a certain Creed) that is to say, to no religion at all.’106  If indifference 
has been taken so far such that ‘Protestant’ denotes nothing more than the negation of 
Catholicism, then Protestantism itself is in no condition to facilitate an alliance between 
two normally hostile religions against the atheist threat.  The final irony is that because 
atheists look to overturn ‘all Civil order,’ sparing no one, the Protestant Ascendency’s 
religious self-debasement will be their political undoing.107    
We might find Burke’s argument that indifference could pave the way to 
persecution unconvincing and overwrought. His Manichean dismissal (‘those who do not 
dread [Jacobinism] love it’) of the possibility that people may be doctrinally indifferent 
and yet still resist the lure to persecute the more devout among their fellows will strike 
many today as equal parts politically menacing and sociologically inaccurate.108  His 
argument may seem less unusual when examined through the lens of what Iain 
Hampsher-Monk has called Burke’s ‘Anglican Skepticism.’109 Consequentialist 
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arguments concerning the moral and political effects of weakened religious conviction 
had a long pedigree among Anglican opponents of Deists, atheists and other critics of the 
established Church.  What Burke offers in the 1790s is an amplified version of this 
argument: indifference towards religious doctrine, while a boon to toleration in some 
circumstances, is a riskier disposition in a political and religious environment dominated 
by the threat of atheism and its fanatical adherents.   
 
The threat of a permanent enthusiasm  
The second troubling tendency that Burke identifies within the new enthusiasm 
concerns its long-term effects on human psychology. As we saw in previous sections, in 
earlier writings Burke seemed to share the assumption of Hume, Gibbon and others that 
enthusiasm at both the individual and collective level was necessarily of limited duration. 
We might expect that atheistic enthusiasm would prove similarly short lived. In 
Reflections and other revolutionary writings, however, Burke showed himself far less 
certain that this new form of enthusiasm would expend itself as quickly.  In an oft-cited 
passage from the Reflections, Burke wavers between confidence that atheistic beliefs will 
be unsupportable by human psychology and acknowledging that the spread of atheism 
may introduce more permanent transformations.  We ‘know,’ he writes, 
that man is by his constitution a religious animal; that atheism is 
against, not only our reason but our instincts; and that it cannot 
prevail long.  But if in a moment of riot…we should uncover our 
nakedness by throwing off the Christian religion which has hitherto 
been our boast and comfort… we are apprehensive… that some 
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uncouth, pernicious and degrading superstition, might take the place 
of it.110   
The passage’s opening moment of certainty about the persistence of an unchanging 
human ‘constitution’ recalls the physiological universalism of Burke’s Enquiry.  
Atheism, like the paroxysms of enthusiasm Burke saw operative in early colonial 
America, ‘cannot prevail long’ because our own instincts will work to correct the psychic 
disharmony it introduces.  The passage ends, however, with an apprehension that this 
human constitution may be more plastic than Burke had previously allowed and that 
atheism could yet dislodge religious belief altogether, paving the way for perniciously 
novel forms of superstition.  Most despairingly for Burke, the people of England 
themselves may be the authors of this change by rashly casting aside their religious 
beliefs and allowing themselves to be seduced by the atheistic doctrines newly arrived 
from France, little aware that they were doing violence to their natural condition as 
‘religious animals.’111   
Note the continuity between Burke’s worry that English Protestants will hasten to 
destroy their own ‘boast and comfort’ with his critique of the policy and attitudes of the 
Protestant Ascendency in Ireland.  In both cases, Burke takes the Protestants in question 
to task for their shortsightedness and failure to understand that once Jacobinism has taken 
hold there is little hope for a return to natural religious sentiment.  In the Second Letter to 
Hercules Langrishe he derides in particular the notion that Catholics, once invited or 
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coerced into revising their faith, might gravitate towards Protestantism.  Doing so, Burke 
echoes again the Anglican fideist worry that opening portions of one’s faith to scrutiny 
could ultimately result, not in a better grounded religious faith, but in no religious faith at 
all.  Once faith is loosened, he warns Langrishe, the process of revision will not ‘stop at 
the exact sticking places you have marked in your Articles’ but extend instead to a 
‘rejection of the whole altogether.’112  Even if, historically, conversions from one 
Christian denomination to another could be made without the basic underlying faith of 
the convert being threatened, in context of the 1790’s this possibility is effectively 
removed: ‘No converts will now be made in a considerable number from one of our sects 
to the other upon a really religious principle.’113 And if conversion is now unidirectional, 
then anyone lost to atheistic enthusiasm must be considered lost for good.    
Taken together, these two tendencies suggest that when Burke declared Price and 
his fellow supporters of the revolution to be enthusiasts he was doing more than merely 
heralding the return of an only too familiar fanaticism.  Instead, he sought to convince his 
readers that the new enthusiasm was both more dangerous and potentially more 
permanent in its effects than the enthusiasms of any other era.  For at stake in this 
particular contagion of enthusiasm (the stemming of which Burke considered his 
Reflections an important part) was the fate of religious belief itself as both social 
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The ferocity with which Burke attacked the rise of atheism explains why many of 
his critics assumed that he himself had given in to enthusiasm, or even madness.  What I 
have suggested here is that the extremism of his response is in turn explained by what he 
considered to be the unique threat posed by atheism to the very possibility of political 
life.  ‘Those who were led only by enthusiasm, and the vanity of the moment,’ Mary 
Wollstonecraft wrote of the French Revolutionaries, ‘esteemed their conduct as highly 
extravagant, when they had time to cool.’114  The fear animating Burke’s own response to 
the Revolution is that the enthusiasm that gave rise to it would be permanent rather than 
momentary and that those who had imbibed Jacobinism would soon lack the requisite 
shame to regard their any of their previous behavior as ‘extravagant.’  With religious 
belief extirpated entirely, a true revolution of moral psychology is completed and a 
willful subjectivism more liable to persecution and political disorder than the religious 
enthusiasms familiar to Burke’s readers is unleashed.     
Aside from serving as a corrective to those who have overstated the similarity 
between religious and atheistic enthusiasm in Burke’s politics my interpretation has 
another significant payoff.  The early indication that Burke sought to rehabilitate a variety 
of enthusiasm for politics, coupled with his qualified appreciation for enthusiasm as a 
fount of political authority, complicates the image of Burke as only adopting a critical 
posture towards enthusiasm.  At the very least, my analysis shows that Burke did not 
approach enthusiasm as an absolute good or evil, but rather always situated it in a 
particular historical and political context and asked after its effects on people, or how it 
may have emerged as a response to particularly chaotic or oppressive circumstances.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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